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SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
IN NEW YORK
Recovery for incomplete or defective work upon or materials attached
to the property of another, with a special considerationof building
and analogous contracts, and a comparison with other jurisdictions
MAX J. WOLFF*

A perplexing problem which has always faced the courts and
which under modem conditions has become increasingly difficult
for them to solve is when to permit recovery for substantial performanceof a contract. As a practicalproposition, in the construction
of large buildings, in the performance of the increasingly intricate
contracts which the increasing complexities of trade, industry,finance
and building necessitate, deviations from the letter of the contract
necessarily occur. Sometimes these deviations are intentional, often
accidental, occasionally quite unavoidable; or they may occur
through the negligence of the contractor. Indeed, complete performance, or even "substantial performance," as a lawyer of an older
day would have understood it, is, when one takes into account the
intricacies of the modem physical world of mechanics and the modem,
somewhat metaphysical world of commerce and finance, occasionally
impractical, if not impossible.
The courts of New York have more and more come to recognize
the conditions making exact or nearly exact performance impractical
or impossible, and they have therefore tended to abandon strict
legalistic logic and the traditional formulae of the law. They have
been struggling toward a solution of the problem of how to achieve
an equitable result in each individual case without depriving the
law of that measure of certainty which law demands. Nevertheless, it
must be recognized that the efforts of the courts to achieve individual
justice in the individual case have tended to make the law a little
more uncertain than it should be, to make the parties to a contract
a little too uncertain of their respective legal rights, of the nature
and extent of the performance which would be required of each.
Quite frequently the appellate courts, prompted by a laudable desire
to shape the law to the ends and needs of the individual case, have
based their decisions upon various and divers reasons of no general
applicability or fundamental soundness. A somewhat too wide discretion is now left to the trier of the facts. And sin 6 e different triers
*Member of the New York City Bar.
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of the facts have different views, under the present state of the law,
the same set of facts might lead one court to permit recovery and
another to deny it.
The cases dealing with substantial performance of contracts are
prolific in every jurisdiction. In New York they are, as is to be expected, more numerous than elsewhere. There is no better way
than a laboratory study of the New York cases to arrive at a comprehension of the really difficult problems which the courts are trying
to solve in these cases. Such a study, once the problems which they
present are clearly understood, should help to bring about some
fairly workable solution.
A recent and important effort of the New York Court of
Appeals to meet in a specific case the problems here discussed
resulted in a court divided four to three.' The majority opinion in
that case was written by Judge, now Chief Judge, Cardozo and an
interesting minority opinion was written by Judge McLaughlin. It
is worthwhile considering this case at some length. The plaintiff
contracted to build a country residence for the defendant. The contract price was upwards of $77,ooo, all of which except $3,483.46 the
defendant paid. The action was against the defendant to recover
this unpaid amount. The specifications for the plumbing work provided that "all wrought iron pipe must be well galvanized, lap welded
pipe of the grade known as 'standard pipe' of Reading manufacture."
The contract was completed in June 1914, and the defendant at
that time began to 6ccupy the house. But subsequently, and as
late as March 1915, the defendant first discovered that some of the
pipe was not manufactured in Reading, but elsewhere. Instead of
Reading pipe the plaintiff had used Cohoes pipe. The evidence in
the case established to the satisfaction of the court that the substitution of Cohoes pipe for Reading pipe was "neither fraudulent nor
willful." It was established that there was no distinction between
Reading and Cohoes pipe, that although the two pipings were of
different manufacture and name, there were no other differences between them. For the purposes of the appeal it was assumed that the
two brands of pipe "were the same in quality, in appearance, in
market value and in cost... that they were, indeed, the same thing,
though manufactured in another place." To remove the Cohoes
pipe and install the Reading pipe in its place would necessitate demolishing substantial parts of the building, since the pipes were for
the most part encased in the walls. Under these circumstances four
'Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 23o N. Y. 239,
leading case.

129

N. E. 889

(1921).

This is a
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of the Judges of the Court of Appeals were of the opinion that the
plaintiff should recover, and the court permitted recovery as for a
substantial performance; three of the Judges however were of the
opinion that the plaintiff should not be permitted to recover. Judge
Cardozo wrote an illuminating majority opinion. Nevertheless, this
opinion helped only a little to clarify and make more certain the law,
a fact which Judge Cardozo himself recognized. He did, however,
grapple bravely with the problem and he did make a gallant attempt
to solve the difficulty. He compared the cases where the courts will
rule that a contract had been substantially performed and the cases
where they will rule that it had not been substantially performed, to'
the cases involving the distinction between dependent and independent promises, between promises and conditions. He said:
"Considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable
intention are to tell us whether this or that promise shall be
placed in one class or in another. The simple and the uniform
will call for different remedies from the multifarious and the
intricate. The margin of departure within the range of normal
expectation upon a sale of common chattels will vary from the
margin to be expected upon
a contract for the construction of a
' 2
mansion or a 'skyscraper'.
Judge Cardozo took occasion to point out:
"Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the
attainment of a -just result will be troubled by a classification
where the lines of division are so wavering and blurred." 3
There are undoubtedly good reasons for being so troubled, and one
may well be troubled for reasons other than a philosophic love of
symmetry and logic. The practical man has good reason for wanting
to know how carefully he must guard against a failure to completely
perform his contract. The man who contracts that work be done for
him may well wonder to what extent he is entitled to performance.
Judge Cardozo's conclusion is:
"Where the line is to be drawn between the impoitant and
the trivial cannot be settled by a formula." 4
This conclusion is distinctly not comforting. It is, after all, the
province of the law to lay down formulae, and to compel people to
live by them. The formulae should be such as to bring about justice
in the greatest number of cases. No legal formula yet devised has
21bi. 242,
3
Ud.242,
4

lbid.

129
129

N. E. at 890.
N. E. at 891.
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been conducive of a just result in every single case to which it was
applied. And yet experience has shown that this failure is in itself
no reason for discarding the formula. The rules of law governing
the nisi prius judge must not be too elastic.
With the result in the case under discussion we cannot quarrel.
Assuming that the pipe used was exactly the same as that contracted
for, the difference being only one of name, and that the substitution
was unintentional, there was clearly a substantial, indeed to all intents and purposes a complete, exact, performance. The pipe was
concealed in the walls, where its name would not be visible to any
one. So that even the vanity of the owner of the building could
in no way have been affected by the substitution, assuming that his
vanity would have been more gratified by Reading than by Cohoes
pipe. There was no injury whatsoever to the owner of the building,
not even an injury to his feelings. The law of contracts assumes that
all the contracting parties are reasonable men, and whether they are
or not, deals with them as if they were. A reasonable man would
necessarily regard such performance as that presented by the case
under discussion as not only substantial, but exact, and one hundred
per cent complete.
Nevertheless, and curious as it may seem, the decision represents
a radical departure from the law as it had been laid down in the previous cases and evoked a vigorous dissenting opinion by Judge McLaughlin, concurred in by two such eminently learned and practical
judges as Judges Pound and Andrews. The gist of the thought of the
dissenting opinion is contained in the following words, words which
are the echo of a long line of decisions in New York and of innumerable decisions in all the American states, as well as in England.*
"Defendant contracted for pipe made by the Reading Manufacturing Company. What his reason was for requiring this
kind of pipe is of no importance. He wanted that and was entitled to it. It may have been a mere whim on his part, but even
so, he had a right to this kind of pipe, regardless of whether some
other kind, according to the opinion of the contractor or experts,
would have been 'just as good, better, or done just as well.' He
agreed to pay only upon condition that the pipe installed were
made by that company and he ought not to be compelled to
pay unless that condition be performed."'
5

Although, as Judge Cardozo says in his opinion in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent,
ibid. 243, 129 N. E. at 891, citing in support thereof the English case of Dakin &
Co. v. Lee, [1916] i K. B. 566: "The decisions in this state commit us to the
liberal view, which is making its way, nowadays, in jurisdictions slow to welcome
it.",
OSupra note z, at 247, 129 N. E. at 89o.
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Nevertheless, it would seem to us that there is no reason why the
trial. court should not have been permitted to pass upon the question
of 'fact whether the pipe supplied was precisely the same as that
contracted for, excepting only the difference of name. The minority
opinion would have deprived the trial court of such power.
The consideration which we have here stressed is not that the trial
court should not be permitted to pass upon what is a fair question of
fact, but rather that the trial court should not be permitted to lay
down the law, to make an individual rule of law for the individual
case, and to decide what is rather a question of law, namely, whether
the facts as found constitute substantial performance. The trial
court may well decide, as in the case under discussion, whether or not
there has been all the performance that a reasonable man may reasonably require, but the question as to what degree of performance warrants a recovery is rather a question of law and should, if possible,
be brought within fixed principles. There is undoubtedly an inherent difficulty to be found in nearly all of the cases under discussion,
and not clearly perceived by the courts, in distinguishing between
the questions of fact in the case and the questions of law in the case.
It is to be noted that the plaintiff in the case under discussion
sought to recover only $3,483.46 and that prior to the institution
by him of the action he had been paid the principal part of the contract price of upwards of $77,ooo.

The defendant did not counter-

claim for the portion of the contract price which he had paid, and if
he had counterclaimed, even the three minority judges would not
have permitted him to recover the paid portion of the contract price.
In all the numerous cases on the subject, in New York and other
jurisdictions, such a recovery has not been permitted.7
Of course it would be manifestly shocking to permit the defendant
to recover from the plaintiff about $73,500 merely because the plain-

tiff had substituted a different piping. Indeed, if the extent of nonperformance had been very much greater, the defendant could still
7
See Walker v. Millard, 29 N. Y. 375 (1864), in which case the Court said:
"The action on the contract having failed, the defendant's counterclaim growing
out of the contract and being in amount considerably less, necessarily failed
also." The same view is expressed in Woodward v. Fuller, 80 N. Y. 312 (188o)
and in other cases also. This view would seem to be illogical. If the plaintiff did
not complete his contract, the Court might logically have taken the view that
there was a failure of consideration for the monies paid by the defendant under the
contract and there is no good legalistic reason why the Court should not have
permitted the defendant who counterclaims therefor to recover the monies paid
by him, the consideration for which has failed. The reasons for not permitting
such a recovery are not legalistic but practical ones, and are referred to in this
article.
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not have counterclaimed, except to the extent of actual damages
susceptible of physical proof. And yet, logically, there is no reason
why,-if A fails to perform his contract and B, after paying the contract price, discovers such failure to perform,-B should not be permitted to recover upon a counterclaim the amount paid as well as to
resist recovery for the amount unpaid. Why this result will not
follow is logically inexplicable. But, although logical, such a result
would be so grossly unjust, so grotesque, that the courts would not
tolerate it.
To revert to the subject under discussion, it would seem that where
the courts have allowed recovery as for a substantial performance,
they have done so on the theory that complete performance is not of
the essence of the contract. Of course, it is possible in every case
to make complete performance essential by an express statement
to that effect. As for instance, in the case last discussed, the contract might have provided that the installation of Reading pipe i-s'
should be of the essence thereof, in which case the installation of
Reading pipe would be a condition of recovery by the contractor.
In cases where the courts have considered the allowance of recovery for substantial performance, they have concerned themselves
with the question of whether the change was of such a character as
to frustrate the purpose of the contract. Such a change would ordinarily not be tolerated. The courts, however, are growing more
reluctant to defeat recovery where there has been a substitution or
a failure to perform of such a character as not to frustrate the purpose of the contract, particularly when such substitution or failure
was not in bad faith.
Of course, as is pointed out in many cases and also in the case last
discussed, a substitution may well have a different significance in the
field of art than in that of utility. Nevertheless, even in the field of
utility it'is hard to draw the line between what may be an unreasonable caprice and between what one may reasonably desire to have
for reasons good and sufficient to himself, even if not clearly perceptible to other people. There may be no known scientific reason
why one brand of radiator in a building should not render the same
service as another brand and the two brands may exactly correspond with each other in quality and appearance. Nevertheless,
should not the owner of a building, having chosen a particular brand,
perhaps because he has, accidentally or otherwise, had more fortunate experiences with the one brand than with the other, be entitled
to receive the brand chosen by him? But what if, at the time the
building is ready for the installation of radiators the brand chosen by
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the owner is, for some reason, no longer procurable by the contractor?
Or suppose it be not the radiators, readily removable and replaceable,
but some integral part of the building itself, like the material of
which the floors or walls are made, that differs from the contract
specifications? Or again, suppose it be the stairs, replaceable but
not as readily replaceable, as the radiators? Where is the line to be
drawn? Again, shall the courts take into account the differences and
similarities between various standard makes, or other differences
and similarities familiar to experts.
The problem in a few of its many manifestations has been stated
at such pains because it is thought that it has seldom been clearly
apprehended. The simpler conditions of a simpler age did not give
rise to the need for such apprehension. To say, as was said by judge
Cardozo in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent,7a that the question is one of
degree, is to relieve the appellate courts of a burden whi6h they
should properly assume and leaves too much to the discretion of the
trial courts.
The uncertain state in which Jacob & Youngs v. Kmt, left the law
was manifested to some extent in a decision of the Court of Appeals
rendered more than two years later in the case of Cawley v. Weiner.8
That case involved a contract for the construction of a dwelling and
garage for the price of $8,5oo. The plaintiff claimed not complete
performance, but substantial performance. It developed that while
the specifications called for a cesspool to be constructed of No. 2
brick, the contractor had supplied cement bricks which he considered
"just as good:" He further omitted to cover the cesspool with a
bricked dome, and to provide a three-inch cement slab. It appeared
also that the drainage pipe was so constructed that when the cesspool filled up to the height of the drainage pipe, the drainage backed
into the house. The dormer roof over the sewing room and toilet
was six inches higher at its outer edge than where it joined the main
roof of the building, being six inches out of level; also, the sun parlor
leaked around the windows. Altogether the defendants claimed
seventeen respects in which performance was defective, of differing
degrees of importance. The specific defects hereinbefore pointed out
were, however, not merely claimed by the defendant, but found, as
facts by the trial judge who, however, allowed the plaintiff the full
amount of the contract price withoutany deduction for the defects
in question.
It would seem that these defects found by the trial judge were
sufficient in extent and importance to defeat any recovery on the
7
aSupra note .
S2 3 6 N. Y. 357, i4o N. E. 724 (1923) decided by a unanimous Court of Appeals.
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contract. It would seem that the plaintiff should not have been permitted as a matter of law to recover on the contract, in view of such
defects. There would seem to be no question that the defects were
sufficiently substantial to frustrate in a very measurable degree the
purpose of the contract. Certainly the defects were of such a nature
as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of the house which the
defendant had had constructed for use as a dwelling. There was no
question that these defects substantially interfered with the comfort,
and possibly with the health of the occupants of the house. There
was no question that the aesthetic results which the defendant had
in mind, when contracting for the construction of the house, were
far from completely attained. Whether or not, and at what cost,
the house could be made to conform to the exact requirements of
the contract, is not the sole consideration under the principles which
will later in this article be suggested as the proper rule for recovery
in such cases as these, a rule which though not exactly new, suggests
itself as both logical, and just in its application to individual cases.
Certain it is, however, that the plaintiff did not perform the contract
in the case under discussion, either completely or substantially, and
whether or not he should have been allowed any recovery on any
other theory, he should not have been allowed to recover upon the
contract. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, in sending the case
back for a new trial, did not come to this conclusion or to any clear,
satisfying conclusion. After speaking of the items of defective performance, the court said:
"If these were proper items for which allowance could be
made, the plaintiff should have proved what the reasonable cost
would be to remedy the condition."
Inferentially, the court in the case under discussion would allow
recovery as for substantial performance, less the cost of making good
the failure to perform. The point we make is that no recovery should
have been allowed upon the contract.
The court did not consider the question of good or bad faith of the.
contractor, perhaps because its judgment did not finally dispose of
the case, or perhaps because good or bad faith was immaterial in
such a case as this, where the defects in performance were of such a
material nature. The unfortunate owner of the house in question
must indeed have been a philosopher if, surrounded by the discomforts resulting from the defects in construction, he-could, nevertheless,
have derived comfort from the good faith of the contractor.
9

1W. 364, I40 N. E. at 726.
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Some question was raised in this case as to whether or not there
had been an acceptance of the contract and a waiver of the defects
be reason of the fact that the defendants had occupied and used the
house. The court pointed out that this was not the law, and that
neither acceptance nor estoppel could be spelled out from the occupancy of the house by the defendants. Very properly the court said:
"This is not a case of the sale of goods.... The house was
built upon the defendants' property. They could move into it,
live in it and in this sense accept it without waivifig any defects
in construction."' 0
And here we place a finger upon the very heart of the problem. It
is true that the contractor had failed to perform his contract inimportant respects. Perhaps this failure was willful. Perhaps it was
unintentional. If unintentional it must have been, in the case under
discussion, due not to any forces or circumstances beyond the contractor's control, but rather to the ineptitude or carelessness of the
contractor. On the other hand, it is equally true that the owner did
not receive the full benefits that he had contracted for, and that the
contract had not been performed, had not even been substantially
performed. Nevertheless, the owner has received some, and perhaps
very great, benefits, and he cannot be deprived of these benefits
because the house contracted for has been built, even if imperfectly
built, on his land, and has become his property irrevocably and forever.
Under those circumstances, it seems to us that the court, facing
the facts squarely, should have held squarely that the contract was
not performed and should have permitted no recovery whatsoever
on the contract. It might, however, have permitted a recovery on a
quasi-contractual theory. It should have followed a line of reasoning
similar to that developed in the cases where, although no contract
of any kind was entered into, A builds a house on B's land. In those
cases if A builds the house innocently and in good faith, he will be
allowed to recover from B to the extent by which B was enriched,particularly, though some cases have not deemed this necessary,
when some responsibility attaches to B, as when he stood silently
by and let A build,- even though such a recovery results in improving B out of his own property, as would be the case where B has not
the money to pay for the improvement and must give up the property
itself in satisfaction of the judgment which A has recovered. n If,
10ITid. 361, 14o N: E. at 725.
"This is not the rule at common law. Perley v. City of Cambridge, 220 Mass.
307, iO8 N.E. 494 (1915). Itis, however, the rule which equity has established. Olin
53o, i68 N. E. 676 (1929); McKelway v. Armour, io N. J.
v. Reinecke, 336 Ill.
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on the other hand, A, not in good faith, or sometimes merely acting
12
negligently, improved B's property, A will be allowed no recovery.
So, in the case under discussion, if the contractor's failure to perform
was not willful or malicious, he should be allowed to recover, on a
quasi-contractual basis, the reasonable value of the labor and materials he has furnished, limited only by the rule that such recovery
should in no event exceed the proportionate part of the contract
price represented by such labor and materials, less what it would
cost to make the house conform with reasonable exactness to the
requirements of the contract, further allowing the owner such other
equitable offsets as he may have. The nature of these equitable offsets is hereinafter more fully discussed. It may even be that the
result in dollars and cents, if such a theory were adopted, would be,
in the case under discussion, the same as under the somewhat less
precisely defined theory of the court, but it would at least establish
a rule which would be a clearer guide for the trial courts in future
cases. If the default of the contractor in the case under discussion
was willful or perhaps malicious,--and indeed it seems that willful
defaults of such a substantial nature as in the case under discussion
might well be malicious in the sense in which the term "malice" is
often used in law,-then it is doubtful whether the contractor should
be permitted any recovery. Upon reasoning analogous with that
contained in the line of cases in which A improves B's property without his consent, it might well be that no recovery should be permitted.
Of course, the recovery, under the rule here laid down, would never
exceed the contract price. It would, in fact, always be less than what
the owner had contracted to pay. Under such circumstances, it
might not be so unjust to permit a recovery on a quasi-contractual
theory. This is a matter upon which there might be a.difference of
opinion, but whichever opinion the courts were to adhere to, a certain fixed rule would nevertheless arise, to be followed in future cases.
If the owner wishes to avail himself of a non-performance by the
contractor he should, unless the contract be one where time is of the
Eq. 115 (1854); Lyons Nat. Bank v. Shuler, ig N. Y. 405, 92 N. E. 8ou (I91O);
Rabb v. Flenniken, 32 S. C. 189, io S. E. 943 (189o); Pearl Township v. Thorp, i7
S. D. 288, 96 N. W. 99 (1903); 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.
1918) § 867, p. 1782.

"Camden, Atlantic & Ventnor Land Co. v. Mason, 91 N. J. Eq. 25, iO8 Atl.
778 (I919) (the mistake in this case was due to negligence and the owner had no
knowledge that buildings were being erected on his land); Steel v. Smelting Co.,
io6 U. S. 447, I Sup. Ct. 389 (1882); Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61 N. Y. 382 (875);
Bohn v. Hatch, 133 N. Y. 64, 30 N. E. 659 (1892); Warner v. Warner, i99 App.
Div. i59, 191 N. Y. Supp. 612 (2d Dept. 1920).
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essence, give the contractor the opportunity to replace such portions
of his work as are defective or complete such portions thereof as are
incomplete. If the contractor wishes to recover upon the contract
he will do so. If the contractor fails to do so within -a reasonable
time, he should be relegated to an action upon a quantum meruit
basis. He will recover what his work is reasonably worth to the
owner, an amount in no event to be greater than the proportionate
contract price of the work done, less the cost of conforming the work
done to the requirements of the contract. Against this amount,
recoverable upon a quantum meruit basis, the owner will be further
permitted to offset or counterclaim any other losses which he may
have sustained by reason of the defective performance or the nonperformance of the contract. These losses must be such as flow
fairly and proximately from the defective performance or the nonperformance. For example, where a house was improperly constructed as in Cawley v. Weiner the owner might properly be unwilling
to occupy the house unless it was properly altered. In such case,
if the owner was put to an additional expense in residing with his
family elsewhere during the course of such alteration, this should be
a loss which may be properly offset against the value of the work
done by the contractor. Or,- if the improper installation of fixtures
in a place of business requires the suspension of business for a few
days or any other period of time, the owner should be permitted to
offset his loss of profits during such suspension. Or, where an electrical display sign is contracted for, to be attached to the realty, and
fails to operate as required by the contract, the loss of advertising
value during the period required to make the sign operate as specified
in the contract, unless too, remote, should be a proper offset by the
owner against the contractor.
These are simple instances of the operation of the rule thatwe
have in mind, a rule which seems to be not too difficult to apply, and
alike applicable to all situations which might arise. Since a quasicontractual recovery is based upon equitable principles, the rules
for measuring the amount of the recovery are flexible, and the court
may properly take into account equitable offsets and other equitable
considerations for which there is no room in an action on the contract
itself.
In a contract, where the subject matter of the contract is susceptible of complete rejection, complete performance is required by the
law. There is no reason why other than complete performance should
be required in a contract where the subject matter thereof is inseverable from the property of the owner, so that he has no choice to
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accept or reject. To avoid injustice to the contractor, however, recovery should be permitted upon a quasi-contractual basis to the
extent and under the limitations hereinbefore outlined, except, perhaps, only in cases where the non-performance or defective performance is so grossly willful as to be malicious.
The concept of substantial performance which the New York
courts have adopted to prevent injustice is inexact and should be
discarded. A contract should be regarded as performed only when
the performance thereof is of such a nature that any reasonable man
would regard it as complete performance.
It is true that the New York courts have said that:
"Substantial performance is performance, the deviations perminor, unimportant, inadvertent and unintenmitted being
3
tional."
Nevertheless, in order to avoid injustice, and because of a reluctance to adhere to a rule of recovery upon a quasi-contractual theory
where the contract has not been completely performed, the New
York courts have shown a tendency to play a curious game of percentages.
Thus, in the case of a contract to build a building at a cost of approximately $i5,ooo, it was held that since the work as done was
worth one-seventh less than it would have been had it been done in
compliance with the contract, there was no substantial performance
and there could be no recovery. 4 Again, in the case of a building
contract, where the contract price was $3,ioo, a failure to perform
"ten percent of the contract price" defeated a claim of substantial
performance. 5 And, in a contract to build a sewer and to make the
water connections, the contract price was $2,85o and the extent
of non-performance was $i8o. The Court of Appeals held that the
extent of non-performance was sufficient to defeat recovery, finding
also abandonment of performance by the contractor. 6 In the case
of another building contract, the court pointed out that about fifteen
percent of the value of the work was unperformed and that neither
13

Gompert v. Healy, 149 App. Div. 198, 199, 133 N. Y. Supp. 689, 69o (2d
Dept. 1912); Mitchell v. Dunmore Realty Co., 126 App. Div. 829, iI N. Y.
Supp. 322 (ist Dept. 19o8). See also Spence v. Ham, 163 N. Y. 220, 57 N. E.
412 (Igoo); Stanton v. New York, 103 Misc. 221, 228, 175 N. Y. Supp. 568, 573
(Ct. of Claims, 1918), where the Court said: "The law requires exact performance
as a condition precedent to recovery."
'4 Mitchell v. Williams, 8o App. Div. 527, 8o N. Y. Supp. 864 (Ist Dept. 19o3).
15Rochkind v. Jacobson, 126 App. Div. 357, iio N. Y. Supp. 583 (2d Dept.
19o8).
1
2Hollister v. Mott, 132 N. Y. 18, 29 N. E. 1103 (1892).
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complete nor substantial performance could be predicated upon so
large a percentage of non-performance.' 7 A failure to perform fourteen percent of a painting, papering and decorating contract precluded recovery thereon.' s Where only a little over one percent of
the contract was uncompleted, a bare majority of the Court of Appeals held that the contract had been substantially performed, even
though the contract called for an architect's certificate of completion
and the architect had refused it by reason of the contractor's failure
to complete. 19 A non-performance to the extent of $1,2oo under a
contract to build a barn for 20$6,9oo was too large a percentage of
non-performance for recovery.
A leading case iO Spence v. Ham.21 In this case the court said that
one who relies upon substantial, as contrasted with complete performance, of a contract, must show that he performed, and that
through inadvertence he omitted to do some insubstantial things,
and he must further show that the things omitted can be supplied
for a comparatively small sum, in which event he can recover the
contract price after deducting that sum. The court squarely places
upon the contractor the burden of showing the cost of supplying the
omissions or remedying the defects. However, the court was of the
opinion, upon the facts of the particular case, that the defects were
of too substantial a nature to warrant any recovery upon the theory
of substantial performance. Such defects seemingly consisted of a
failure on the part of the building contractor to have girders of a
certain length and to properly place the girders and to place a wooden
partition upon a brick wall in the basement, as required by his contract. These defects were, in the opinion of the court, structural defects affecting the solidity of the building and tending to defeat the
object of the contract.
Nevertheless, we think unsound the rule laid down in the case that:
"The one who fails in fully performing and who invokes the
doctrine of substantial performance, must furnish the evidence to measure the compensation for the defects, as that is the
substitute for his failure to do as he agreed."
This rule has led to the difficulties we have pointed out, difficulties which can be obviated by recognizing no basis for recovery on
17Fuchs V. Saladino, 133 App. Div. 710, 118 N. Y. Supp. 172 (Ist Dept. I9O9).
18North American Wall Paper Co. v. Jackson Construction Co., 167 App. Div.
779, 153 N. Y. Supp. 204 (Ist Dept. 1915).
v. Gutman, 134 N. Y. 45, 31 N. E. 271 (1892).
19Crouch
20Smith v. Ruggiero, 52 App. Div. 382, 65 N. Y. Supp. 89 (ist Dept. 19oo),
aft'd, I73 N. Y. 614, 66 N. E. ix16 (I9O3).
2'Supranote 13.
"Ibid. 227, 57 N. E. 414.
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the contract where it has not been completely performed, but permitting a quasi-contractual recovery under the limitations hereinbefore described.2
Of course, Spence v. Ham speaks of "insubstantial omissions". In
many of the cases where the New York courts have allowed recovery
for substantial performance the omissions have been something more
than insubstantial.
Professor Williston has pointed out:
"The classical English doctrine, it is true, has denied recovery altogether where there has been a material breach even
though it was due to negligence rather than to wilfulness;24
and a few decisions in the United States follow this rule, where
the builder has not substantially performed."2"
Professor Williston says in a footnote:
"It is interesting to observe that New York which follows the
strictest theory here is the
typically lenient State in allowing
''
recovery on the contract. 2
Professor Williston refers in the footnote just quoted to the New
York cases of Smith v. Brady" and Steel Storage & Elevator ConstructionCo. v. F. W. Stock. 8
In the first of these cases the court pointed out that the owner had
a right to prescribe the manner in which he wanted his house con"Other interesting New York cases which may be read by one desirous of
comparing the various cases in which the question of substantial performance
arose and in which recovery was either allowed or not allowed, are Glacius v.
Black, So N. Y. 145 (1872); Heckmann v. Pinkney, 81 N. Y. 211 (i880); Wbelan
v. Ansonia Clock Co., 97 N. Y. 293 (1884); Parke v. Franco-American Trading
Co., 12o N. Y. 51,23 N. E. 996 (189o); Flahertyv. Miner, 123 N. Y. 382,25 N. E.
418 (i89o); Chambers v. Lancaster, 3 App. Div. 215, 38 N. Y. Supp. 253 (2d.
Dept. 1896); Ellison v. Creed, 34 App. Div. 15, 53 N. Y. Supp. 1054 (2d. Dept.
1898); Fox v. Davidson, 36 App. Div. 159, 55 N. Y. Supp. 524 (ist Dept. 1899);
Easthampton Lumber & Coal Co. v. Worthington, i86 N. Y. 407, 79 N. E. 323
(z9o6); Van Orden v. MacRae, 121 App. Div. 143, IO5 N. Y. Supp. 6oo (2d
Dept. 1907), aff'd, 193 N. Y. 635, 86 N. E. 1134 (19o8); Bullinger v. Interboro
Brewing Co., 194 App. Div. 205, 185 N. Y. Supp. 481 (2d Dept. 192o) and the

numerous cases therein cited from New York and other states; Brackman v.
Gillies, 188 N. Y. Supp. 750 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Cohen v. Eggers, 219 App. Div. 429,
N. Y. Supp. IO9 (ist Dept. 1927); Dearstine v. Dunkle, 223 App. Div.
795, 228 N. Y. Supp. 191 (3d Dept. 1928).
4
2' n the sentence following the one here quoted Professor Williston points out
22o

that the English courts have themselves abandoned this doctrine.
263 WLLIsroN, CONTRACTS (1920) 2627.

26bid. n. 36.
2717 N.
28225

Y. 173

(1858).

N. Y. 173, 121 N. E. 786 (1919).
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structed and that it was not for the contractor "to say that another
mode of construction would do just as well." This is an early case
and the rule of strict performance was laid down. Judge Comstock
in a concurrring opinion argued that there was no obligation on the
part of the owner to pay even on a quantum Meruit theory; that when
a thing of value has been affixed to the land the owner is not in a
position to elect to accept it or not; that if it be not what he contracted
for he should not be required to pay for it; and that only if performance is complete should the owner be under any obligation to pay.
Judge Comstock remarked:
"If the owner prefers a plain and simple Doric column, and
has so provided in the agreement, the contractor has no right to
put in its place the more costly and elegant Corinthian. '29
It is true that the New York courts have more or less frowned upon
attempts of contractors to supply something different, but, in the
'3
opinion of the contractor, "just as good.
In Steel Storage & Elevator Construction Co. v. F. W. Stock, the
plaintiff had undertaken to build an elevator, the capacity of which
was to be four thousand bushels an hour. The elevator, as constructed, however, did not have a larger capacity than three thousand three hundred bushels an hour. Under such circumstances, the
court held that there could be no recovery because there had been no
substantial performance, either on a contractual or a quasi-contractual theory. A reading of the record of the case indicates that the
grain elevator built on the defendant's land was used by the defendant. Yet he was permitted to use it without any compensation to
the contractor who built it becasue it differed in an important detail
from the specifications. The court felt that in the case of a grain
elevator "rapid performance was a material element."
A possible quasi-contractual basis of recovery was disposed of by
the Court in the following language:
"Plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair value of its work and
materials only as it built them into the elevator plant which it
agreed to construct." 3'
Of course, if the elevator plant constructed was so different from the
one contracted for as to be of no practical value to the owner, then
no recovery should have been permitted. It may well be that the
owner would have been better off if he had torn down the elevator
plant constructed and built a new one of a larger capacity. If this
29
Supra note 27,
3

at 186.
Schultze v. Goodstein, I8o N. Y. 248, 73 N. E. 21 (19o5).
31
Supra note 28, at 176, 121 N. E. at 787.
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were so, then, of course, no recovery could properly have been permitted, even on a quasi-contractual basis. The elevator plant could
in such event have been of no material benefit to the owner. Also,
under the quasi-contractual principles suggested in this article, there
probably would have been no recovery in this case. The owner
would have been entitled to offset against the reasonable value of the
elevator plant as constructed the difference between the value of the
plant as constructed and the value of the plant contracted for, and
as consequential damages the loss of profits and business during
the probable life of the elevator plant resulting from the smaller
capacity of the plant. Such offsets or defenses would in all probability have precluded any recovery for the reasonable value of the
plant constructed. So under the principles here suggested the result
of the case would have been the same and the rules laid down therein
of more general application.
It seems to us that Professor Williston's objection to the New York
law is well taken. He cites Nolan v. Whitney 2 and says:
"Under the existing New York law a builder may do his work
pretty well, declining to comply with reasonable requirements
of the architect and, nevertheless, recover a contract price expressly made conditional on compliance with such requirements, less such deduction as the jury thinks reasonable."33
And in spite of the language of the New York cases hereinbefore
quoted to the effect that substantial performance means exact performance, the New York law seems to be very much what Professor
Williston says it is. The New York courts do not seem to require performance of a contract for recovery thereon. An example of this failure of the New York courts to require performance of a contract for
recovery thereon is the case of Woodward v.Fuller.34 Though an attempt to achieve a just and equitable result in the individual case is
what motivated the New York courts to abandon the requirement of
exact performance, the law has in consequence become somewhat
confused and uncertain. This confusion and uncertainty is avoidable
if strict.performance be insisted upon, but a quasi-contractual recovery allowed.
288

N. Y. 648 (1882).

332 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 1540, n. 8.
48o N. Y. 312 (i88o). The following cases cited in Woodward v. Fuller and not
elsewhere referred to in this article are also of interest: Pullman v. Coming, 9
N. Y. 93 (1853); Sinclair v. Tallmadge, 35 Barb. 6o2 (N. Y. 1861); Valser v.
Millard, 29 N. Y. 375 (1864); Johnson v. DePeyster, 5o N. Y. 666 (1872); Phillip
v. Gallant, 62 N. Y. 256 (1875).
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The case of Olsen v. Henderson5 presents the interesting situation of
a house built not on the lines shown on the plans which were part of
the contract, but built one foot out of place. Under the circumstances
of this case it might well be that performance was substantially complete, the deviation being trivial and occasioning no damage to the
owner of the house. The court held that the plaintiff might recover
the contract price less the difference between the value of the house
as itwas actually constructed and as it would have been if it had been
set according to the plan. This case is mentioned in passing; it is a
true type of the class of case in which performance is so nearly exact
as to be, for all practical purposes, complete. Of course, if one
foot of the house in question had been built upon an adjoining lot,
belonging to a different owner, a different situation would have been
presented.
Though very liberal in allowing recovery even where a contract
has not been fully performed, the New York courts have taken a
harsh view toward a contractor who has abandoned the performance
of his contract. It may well be that one who abandons a contract
before it is fully completed does less harm than one who finishes his
work, but in such a way as to require the undoing of some of the work
that he has done. Yet the New York courts have placed in a more
favorable position one who has made some show of completing his
contract than one who has deliberately abandoned it, even though
the abandonment takes place after a large degree of performance
beneficial to the other party to the contract. The deliberateness of
the abandonment is the reason the courts refuse recovery.
A somewhat unusual situation of this kind was presented in Fokine
v. Shubert."8 The plaintiff in this case was employed to render services in connection with the production of a ballet. It seems to have
been his duty to arrange the ballet and prepare it for presentation
and to conduct the necessary rehearsals. He did a large part of the
preliminary work but did not complete it. He conducted numerous
rehearsals. There was no question that his work was of substantial
value. At one of the final rehearsals the plaintiff became angry by
reason of the fact that some of the chorus girls laughed at his 'mannerisms and he walked out refusing to return and complete his work.
No recovery whatever was permitted. The court said:
"The contract was an entire one, was only partly performed.
Further performance of it was abandoned voluntarily and without fault on the part of the other party to the pact and without
his consent. There was no prevention by defendant of further
i96

31I3 App. Div. 676, 99 N. Y. Supp. 917 (2d Dept. 19o6).
362io App. Div. 468; 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 311 (Ist Dept. 1924).
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performance by plaintiff, nor was there any tender of completion refused. Nothing under such circumstances can be recovered on the theory of quantum
meruit, and the complaint
37
should have been dismissed."
In another case, involving a contract to furnish refrigeration, the
court said:
"Although the plaintiff elected to sue upon the theory of a
quantum meruit, the written contract was proven. The plaintiff
could not avoid its obligations to perform the conditions of the
contract by the simple process of ignoring the contract and designating its demand
a cause of action upon the theory of a
'38
quantum meruit. '
And in many other cases also recovery was not permitted because
the contract was abandoned before fully completed."
Of course, willful, malicious abandonment, of a nature calculated
to do harm, should preclude recovery. But a fetish should not be
made of the word "abandonment." An abandonment in any case
should prevent recovery on the contract. But, unless malicious and
of a highly injurious nature, should not in every case prevent a quasicontractual recovery under the rules hereinbefore suggested.
The courts in other jurisdictions have upon occasions taken what
4
seems to be a fundamentally sounder view. Thus, a Vermont court,
as far back as i86o, pointed out that a party failing to perform could
recover only such a sum as his labor had benefited the other party.
This court pointed out that had the contractor strictly and literally
kept his agreement, he would have been entitled to the contract
price. Having failed to do this, he must first deduct from the contract price such a sum as will fully compensate the other party to the
contract for the imperfection in the work and the insufficiency of
materials, so that in this respect the other party to the contract
should be made as good pecuniarily as if the contract had been strictly
performed; secondly, the party failing to perform must also deduct
from the contract price whatever additional damages his breach of
the contract may have occasioned the other. It was pointed out
that only by considering both of these elements can the benefit which
'bid. 470, 206 N. Y. Supp. at 313.

38

Automatic Refrigerating Co. v. N. Y. Independent Meat Co., i42 N. Y.

Supp. 478, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
39
Kohl v. Fleming, 21 Misc. 690, 47 N. Y. Supp.

1092 (Sup. Ct. 1897), is an
illustration of this type of case. The action in that case was, however, for only a
small unpaid balance, a situation which obtains in a great many of the cases
where recovery was not allowed by reason of abandonment.
40
Kelly & Bragg v. Bradford, 33 Vermont 35 (i86o).
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the one party to the contract might have derived from the labor of
the other, when such benefit is measured by the contract and the
4
contract price, be ascertained. '
Another interesting situation in which the New York Court of
Appeals relieved a party of strict performance is to be found in the
case of Matter of Casualty Company of America (.Bliss Company
Claim).$2 Though not exactly in line with the subject matter of this
article, it is illustrative of the tendency of the New York courts to
relieve a party of strict performance when strict performance works
a hardship, and yet to permit recovery on a contract unperformed.
In this case A agreed to machine-finish certain forgings for B. It
was held that there was an implied warranty that the forgings could
be machine-finished by ordinary commercial means, and that since
the forgings were made of such metal that-it was impossible, except
at great expense, delay and by extraordinary means, to perform the
work contracted for, the failure to perform was not a breach of contract. Of course, if the failure to perform was due to no fault of the
contractor but rather to that of the other party to the contract or
of the subject matter of the contract itself, there is no reason for
refusing recovery on the contract. Thus, inthe case of Kuhs v. Flower
City Tissue Mills Co.,43 the contractor was required to build foundation walls. It was specifically provided in the contract "that the
0

For a comparison with other jurisdictions, and also with earlier times, the
520, 9
Sup. Ct. 5oi (r889); Kaufman v. Raeder, io8 Fed. 171 (C. C. A. 8th, i9oi), 54
L. R. A. 247 (1902); St. Charles v. Stookey, 154 Fed. 772 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907);

following cases should be read: Stillwell Mfg. Co. v. Phelps, 130 U. S.

Northwestern Theatrical Ass'n v. Hannigan, 218 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 2d,

i914);

Haywood v. Leonard, 7 Pick. i8 (Mass. 1828); Moulton v. McOwen, 103 Mass.
587 (1870); Powell v. Howard, io9 Mass. 192 (1872) in which case it was pointed
out that a contractor who has not fully performed is entitled to recover what his
work is fairly worth, having regard to the contract price, and that the contractor
must make good what the owner has suffered by his failure to perform; Marsh v.
Richards, 29 Mo. 99 (1859); Walter v. Huggins, 164 Mo. App. 69, 148 S. W.
148 (1912); Danforth v. Freeman, 69 N. H. 466, 43 AtI. 621 (1898); Thornton v.
Place, I Moody & R. 218 (1832); H. Dakin & Co. v. Lee, supranote 5. A further
comparative study of the 'cases may be made by reading the annotations in
(1923) 23 A. L. R. 1435, and the cases from the various states in such annotation
cited; also 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§ 724, 805, 841 to 843 incl. and the foot
notes of such sections; also 13 C. J.691, particularly note 85 and the supplements
of Corpus Juris containing further citations under such note. Reference should
also be made to CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT § 270, and to the annotations thereto
in 15 CORNELL LAW QuARTERLY (Supp.) 177-180.
42250 N. Y. 410, I65 N. E. 829 (1929).
4I04
Misc. 243, 171 N. Y. Supp. 688 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 231 N. Y. 637, 132
N. E. 919 (1921).
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waterproofing shall be water-tight." Nevertheless, one of the walls
cracked and was not water-tight. The court however, said:
".... where the owner assumes to specify the manner of
construction to produce the result, the owner assumes'44the responsibility if the work does not turn out as expected.
And in another case,41 a contractor who built a reservoir for the City
of Brooklyn was allowed to recover the contract price even though
the reservoir was defectively constructed and leaked, inasmuch as
he had performed his work in accordance with the instructions of
the engineer for the city.
These cases illustrate the rule that defective performance may
nevertheless be complete performance, a rule, the soundness of
which under the circumstances given in the cases hereinbefore dicussed, cannot be questioned. But this article has been concerned
primarily with cases where defective or incomplete performance was
due neither to the fault of the party to the contract for whom the
work was done nor to the subject matter of the contract itself, but
rather to the fault of the contractor. The following is submitted.
CONCLUSION

If the defects or omissions are of so trivial a nature as to have
caused no appreciable damage or injury, the law properly does not take
cognizance of them. In such cases, the performance is not merely substantial, it is complete, exact, literal performance. If the defects or
omissions are of a nature more than trivial, so as to have caused other 7"
than nominal damage or injury, the contract has not been performed.
The theory of substantial performance, as the New York courts have
adopted it, should not be applied. No recovery should be allowed on
the contract. The contractor should, however, be allowed a recovery
upon a quasi-contractual basis, unless his abandonment of the contract, his non-performance or his defective performance thereof, has
been of a malicious nature, deliberately calculated to cause injury to
the other party to the contract or to defy his reasonable wishes expressed in the contract, wishes which should be even more literally
followed in the field of art or esthetics than in the field of utility. If
such malicious or deliberately defiant conduct on the part of the contractor is not present, and if the defects or omissions are not of such
a pervasive nature as to defeat the object of the contract, the contractor should be allowed a recovery upon the following quasi-conMSupra note 43, at 248, 171 N. Y. Supp. at 691.
4In Re Freel, 38 N. Y. Supp. 143 (Sup. Ct. x895).
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tractual basis: He should recover the reasonable value of his labor and
materials, in no case to exceed the proportionate part of the contract
price represented by such labor and materials, less the reasonable
cost of conforming the work done' to the exact requirements of the
contract, and as against this recovery the other party to the contract
should be allowed to offset the loss or injury he has sustained
by reason of the defective or insufficient performance, including any
loss or injury which flows fairly and proximately from the defective
or insufficient performance, such as the deprivation of the full enjoyment of his property during the period required for making the
work done conform to the work contracted for, including items
such as loss in profits or advertising value during the period of time
the improper or inadequate performance necessarily remained unremedied, or any other special damages which the special circumstances of the particular case might require, such damages to be
based upon such equitable offsets or considerations as might properly
commend themselves to the court.

